How To Write About Islam

Substitute, combine and conflate Islam, Arabs and the Middle East. Only twenty percent of Muslims are Arabs. The Middle East has plenty of other ethnic groups. The biggest Muslim majority country is Indonesia, which is further from Mecca than London is. Use whichever group is convenient for your point, or fits better for the copy desk.

Rely on antiquity to explain causes. Origin stories are great for comic books and history. Rely on them. The Hidden Imam hides TV remote controls all the time: be sure to put him at the centre of all geopolitical debates as well.  Arguments and schisms are ideal forms free from a context of time and space, so leap happily across multiple centuries for connections or conclusions. Any contrary examples or entire flourishing empires that happen to chronologically fall in between two steps in your argument can be safely ignored. Wars and treaties of the 19th and 20th centuries are also too recent to offer the broad vista your readers need.

Poetry is sewn like a silken thread throughout Islamic culture; the Qur’an is sometimes described as a poem dictated by Allah, the unique, the mighty. The poetic Muslim soul should not be sullied by description with brutish numbers. Economic or demographic details are tedious grey filler in your portrait of the spiritual world of Islam.

Use generalized definite articles a few times to give the article a sense of scholarly generality. If at all possible, discuss The Muslim as a noun, but if not, at least deploy general terms as adjectives, like The Muslim Mind, Islamic Civilization, or that notoriously opinionated piece  of civil engineering, The Arab Street.

Praise your subject and their generous traditions of hospitality to guests, at least when you’re not talking about how nasty and self-explosive they are.

Call for an Islamic Reformation. Don’t let the lack of an Islamic Pope deter you. European religious and political history translates simply into the Near, Middle and Far East.

Turbans and burqas. Oh yeah.

If you must use references, restrict them to a single source, preferably Bernard Lewis. Lewis is a Princeton scholar with vast experience and erudition, particularly on the Ottoman Empire. His political punditry and close association with the American government don’t need further attention. There’s certainly no need to mention any abstruse academic debates he’s been involved in.

Draw to an expansive and general conclusion about Islam as a whole, eschewing pedantically specific elements. Look into your heart. In the end, like Islam, writers need to find solutions within themselves.

((This guide is indebted to How To Write About Africa and a huge corpus of inspirational articles in the Anglophone press.))

A White Horse Is Not A Horse

   曰:马者,所以命形也;白者,所以命色也。命色者非名形也。故曰:“白马非马”。
公孙龙子

‘Horse’ is that by which we name the shape. ‘White’ is that by which we name the color. Naming the color is not naming the shape. So white horse is not horse.
  — Gongsun Longzi

public class Horse extends Shape{
 ...
}

public class WhiteHorse extends Horse implements Colourable
{
  public Colour getColour(){ return Colours.WHITE; }

  public boolean equals( Object other ){
    if ( !other instanceof WhiteHorse){
      return false; 
    }
    ...
  }
}

public class AnotherWhiteHorse{

  public Shape getShape(){ return ShapeConstants.HORSE; }

  public Colour getColour(){ return Colours.WHITE; }

}


public class Argument{
  public static void main(String[] args){
    Horse horse = new Horse();
    WhiteHorse whiteHorse = new WhiteHorse();
    AnotherWhiteHorse anotherWhiteHorse = new AnotherWhiteHorse();
    log.info( whiteHorse == Horse.class );
    log.info( WhiteHorse.class == Horse.class );
    log.info( WhiteHorse.class.equals( Horse.class ) );
    log.info( whiteHorse == horse );
    log.info( whiteHorse.equals ( horse ) );
    log.info( anotherWhiteHorse == horse );
    log.info( anotherWhiteHorse.equals ( horse ) );
    log.info( anotherWhiteHorse instanceof Horse.class );
    log.info( "Therefore white horse is not horse" );
  }
}

On The Software Side

It is suggested that this burgeoning of commerce was the result of the networks of Chinese and other Muslim refugees who had fled China for South East Asia in the late 14th century linking with the Ming-sponsored maritime voyages of the early 15th century. The increased use of picis and more other common media of exchange was a direct result of this.

On the software side of political organization, the administrative and bureaucratic systems which the Ming introduced to Jiaozhi and Tai “native offices” were adopted and utilized by Dai Viet from the late 1420s onwards, and by Tai polities in the latter part or the century. This new “legibility” allowed states to prosper, consolidate and expand.

— Wade, Southeast Asia in the 15th century, in volume of same title, Wade, Sun ed.

Encapsulation Variations

The Chinese annals relate that when the armies of Kublai Khan invaded, several tribal tu’ssu, in particular the Hani or He-man, offered prolonged resistance. In this context the walled city of Mojiang or Ta-lang (Akha: Tm-lang) is mentioned (Mojiang Editorial Committee, 1983). Full occupation of Yunnan and submission of the Wu-man, He-man. and Yung Barbarians was achieved slowly in bloody wars between the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries. This culminated in the Yunnan war between 1855-1873 in which the tribal peoples of the south-western border areas joined a rebellion of the Islamic Haw Chinese (ed: Hui 回族) against Manchu rule. The rebellion was also triggered by the danger of infiltration by Western colonial powers through China’s ‘back-door’, Yunnan, and its fabulous resources. This is confirmed by French and British sources. The British had occupied Burma. The French had brought the ‘miracles’ of French ‘civilization’ to Cochin China in the form of a rigid system of taxation and forced labour. In Yunnan they found an impoverished and desperate population, oppressed by Hani or Tai tu’ssu and Chinese administrators (Scott and Hardiman, 1900; Bonifacy, I904; Henry. I903; Madrolle. 1925; Vial. 1917).

Over many centuries, therefore, the more inaccessible parts of mountainous southern Yunnan, and neighbouring Vietnam, Laos, and Burma became the ‘zonas de refugio’ for tribal groups marginalized by the smaller vassal states which occupied the lowland aras. In this process of marginalization, tribal groups such as the Hani and Akha also selected and constructed their habitats — in terms of altitude and surrounding forestation – in such a way that they would not be easily accessible to soldiers, bandits, and tax-collectors. Such processes have been termed ‘encapsulation’ (Douglas, 1965). They led in this case to differentiation in dialect and forms of dress. In parallel, however, they developed a distinctive unifying social and political structure. which I have called an ‘ethnic alliance system’.
— Leo Alting von Gesau, Akha Internal History: Marginalization and the Ethnic Alliance System in Turton (ed.) Civility and savagery: social identity in Tai States

Contrast a personally more familiar usage: data and methods need to be forcibly constrained over time to stay within the control of the engineer of the system.

This is not an attempt at etymology. I would guess the source of the computer science definition is more likely via chemistry.

I found the quote in another book, and due to the weirdly patchy nature of google books was able to find the source of the quote but not of the original term encapsulation as used by Douglas in 1965. Only the first page of the bibliography of Civility and savagery: social identity in the Tai states is available online. I wonder if this is due to a little sloppiness in scanning. I can imagine the impatient intern thinking “who reads bibliographies anyway, all the content is already over”. Or perhaps it’s the fault of some weird copyright terms condition analogous to the text-as-unicode text being present for search but not accessible to copy and paste, so getting back to text requires using FreeOCR. I’m not even sure who Douglas is – some second guessing suggests perhaps Mary Douglas, who did write about construction of excluded groups, but didn’t publish a book that year and whose Purity and Danger from a year later doesn’t contain the word encapsulation. It’s very weird having the science fictional awesomeness of Google books at your fingertips, but having to search a library like a really long Word document, when the hyperlink equivalent (ie, a reference) could be right there.

At any rate, without a physical copy of the book in a library I can access, Douglas’ definitive coining has gone 404 and the brave digital world of Google books has worse linkrot than a standard academic bibliography. I guess their hrefs are a little too thoroughly encapsulated.

Deliberate Anarchy As Climate Governance

It is informative to think about the science of changing climate as two fields. The first is long-term meteorology, making predictions about how the atmosphere and climatic conditions change over long periods of time. This is about a century and a half old and built on physics, chemistry, and observations from a variety of real time and historical sources such as satellites and ice cores. The current dominant paradigm of long-term meteorology includes anthropogenic climate change driven by atmospheric carbon and other gases. It’s a very successful theory whose dominance has been cemented by a track record of new data emerging and anamolies resolving in ways which confirm it. The discovery that satellite measured temperatures were not accounting for relativistic effects caused by the speed of the satellites, and this was causing almost exactly the anomalous difference between ground and satellite temperatures, was one of the more dramatic of these. This was nearly ten years ago. The existence of a handful of outlying dissenting experts outside the paradigm is just confirmation that it’s a real scientific community; the same phenomenon accompanied Newtonian mechanics and the molecular theory in chemistry too. This is reality, as best we can tell.

The second field is political climatology, dealing with the ways a mass of people and their social institutions deal with the climate of the planet they live on. This is a new field at which we are still pretty awful (including attempts by climate scientists). I use the term political climatology deliberately, by analogy with the political economy, ie, economics, and the constraints that politics as a human behaviour places on it. We are pretty bad at the political economy, though we’ve had a few wins over the last century. At political climatology we are just pants.

I don’t just mean we are awful in that we have lousy outcomes, I mean the whole structure of the discussion and the seriousness of institutional design is lacking. The entire debate is in the wrong place. There are interesting arguments within climate science, and there are major and controversial policy decisions to be made. We have a science built on all the sophistication of the Englightenment and the Industrial Revolution, and a monster set of interlinked problems caused by the wondrous success of the same. Meanwhile our toolset for discussing and organizing around it as a society is like five drunk old men with head injury debating the existence of an iPhone.

There is one intellectually tenable policy position which can be shared between someone serious about seeing the world as it is and the fairy land tales of climate fabulists or deniers. That is the policy of deliberate neglect. Accepting the fact of human driven climate change, we choose not to make governments act to remediate it.

Though the changing climate is indeed something to dread and gird ourselves against, the argument goes, any political solution would cause damage too great to our institutions. 

Usually this is framed as economic cost, and people like Jim Manzi argue, contra Stern et al, that the GDP costs of mitigation are simply smaller than the benefits.

There are technical problems with Manzi’s argument: scenario choice is highly selective, and GDP is a lousy basis for century scale prediction. That latter post also suggests in an ecological catastrophe, money may not be everything. (When The Economist suggests you are suffering compulsive quantification disorder and need to sit back and smell the drowning flowers, something is up.) Nevertheless Manzi’s willingness to grapple publicly with scientific reality in arguing policy, something that say, George Monbiot, does routinely from a different political tradition, gets towards the type of debate required.

Climate change is a global problem, and worse than that, a global collective action problem. It’s also larger than a few percent of GDP. In the history of the world, there has been environmental catastrophe, but there has never been democratic world government. Dan Hannan, among others, argues that this is a straightforward function of the distance of the government from individual concerns. It helps to know that Hannan is a ferociously euroskeptic MEP, and has more recently found it convenient to disparage the science without fully disavowing it. Even souveriniste libertarian conviction politicians have bases to mollify, I guess.

The sorry record of corruption and bad policy in global institutions does rather support Hannan’s position, though. Indeed, even the experience of the smaller, transnational, EU supports it – technocratic, with little democratic check, and corrupt to the degree its accounts have not been signed off by an auditor in a dozen years. For those who support a different factional football team, consider the IMF, or the WTO. And as beautiful as the vision of the United Nations is, the power there is with the Security Council, a standing committee of Great Powers and their proxies. 

This is not a screed about UN black helicopters and mind control rays. We simply need to be clear-eyed about the state of our global political institutions before we hand them the Earth’s thermostat. This is especially since decades of dithering makes geoengineering more likely, or necessary.

Some (say, certain large, industrial, non-democracies) may  take the utilitarian line that political niceties are a luxury in the face of catastrophe – a case of give me liberty and give me megadeath. And certainly geophysics doesn’t care about politics. However, the argument for ecofascism is not only rather odious in itself, but highly centralised government has an appalling environmental record. Capitalism and democracy have their environmental failures, but communism is the most toxic pollutant man has yet devised. Contrast the Cuyahoga River and the Aral Sea. 

The environment, in this argument, is too important to be passed off to a global bureaucracy to create a Common Fisheries Policy for carbon. Human nature and its politics will not change any time soon. Better for liberty and ecosystems alike that nations remain in productive mutual anarchy.

That is not my position – this note is a way of thinking through the problem. There are other approaches. The world almost tried one with Kyoto-Copenhagen. Tech can change faster than human nature, and different social contexts allow it different expression. Deliberate anarchy is credible enough to be the benchmark. We can easily do worse. Can we do better?

花雨从天来 /已有空乐好 – 李白:寻山僧不遇作

A light rain fell as if it were flowers falling from the sky, making a music of its own – Li Bai, Looking For A Monk And Not Finding Him, Allen trans.